In considering the instrumental value of the humanities, the actual tangible value rather than the intrinsic, I find myself circling back to the value of thought and critical assessment. The humanities, in my opinion, emphasize a way of thinking that involves multiple sources, ideas, and methods of research. Howard Brody mentions this as well, stating, “I doubt any teacher would deny that a course in the humanities will convey certain thinking skills that are applicable to other human activities or that these skills are of value to the student.” The value inherent in evaluation and deep thought are applicable to every other subject of study out there. Politics, physics, psychology all necessitate the use of analysis of what is presented, and the ability to look for what is not plainly spoken.

The instrumental value of humanities does indeed come partially from its value to other aspects of study, and I fully agree with this, as mentioned. But what Clune brings up that I feel Brody does not is the equality of value and the ways in which humanities professors have to assign value while pretending not to. What he says is, “This eschewal of hierarchy appears eminently progressive,” a statement which hinges on the word ‘appears’. Value is not equivalent across the board, and to wash all humanities and products of the humanities as equally valuable in their instrumental use is ignorant.

Ultimately I think the tension between instrumental and intrinsic value is important to acknowledge and understand, but there is something to be said for the evaluation of which is more important in what context. To me, context is the key to understanding when the different values are applicable and which is more important, something I feel they both failed to fully realize within their articles.